+4 ann 
idee 

Wh 
Ws, #oahe 


sri 
wots 


$a: te 


| i 

v HU Meda ay it 

nant a7 iy ihn vs hefig 
4 ie " 

Wy ' ae 


i ice! 


Wi ‘ up r 
akan : 
rie dee ada 


gt 


iia 


Menthe s 
pe f 


i aya a 1 


why yy ig, 
Mite eek A 


Aaya 


ie ie r by 


MLE URY 
hi 


aa, Aiota! 
Uy ihe! daly ] 


eiice 
Pat 


a 


ay 


nee 
itech 
Wethepegs 


hai eh if 7 
i 4 Rieke Ti 
Lhe g 


AGS) 
bist 


LAN ety 


me 
: eS 9 he mare 


pas mn i ‘ 
en hs tp 
a te a a 


are Deh 
a ; ae 


Sicha 
mai 


Wnese sae 
Ate 
oe nee 


scat oe at An roe rit 


‘ Eas O 


Rr ee ay 


Ine Wide 
iby Aa : ve a ° 
tig Ca H : 

pa 
i ies Sei Apt 


ay 
ey 


fae 


Snr Mast 


Mish each He 
{ tf Ft ) 

eae 
Scien seirnemaey: 


Pees 


LH Nek 4 
a enka, 
te | 


yeti 


a 


ere 
3 in ark cy rw 
WPA: Hoe TPE 
Riera a” niet bye 


eb d vi 
tae Laney 


ai mk futta Her 
ght jak i 
Son a 


Say 
sion 


seit 


sai sia 
: mba bed) 
ua ' 
WOE Te beat Whe 
nit Hee a fi \ 


ae Renee i vip 


beet 9 Pitasoahe 
ihe i a bi 
raed 


Sst 


taiies 


fara 
ats fess 


* 


tert» 


igh site 


i) 
ll 
Tita uo 
ih on - 
a5 east 


ait yaorre pa 
» 


i 
ih 


iy 
f bean pa I r alte ollety Bi bestia etd 
4 j b. ~ 5 oy = Th Seubert 4 
aa tirete apa tee By CUA at 


a A eDey sane wet 
te ae oe 


4 
pes 
* 


ae oe 
ia 
anys 





Seong Fy 


FORBES LIBRARY 


NORTHAMPTO 


ETTS 











AL?01L0 363c9? 














How Structures Withstood the Japanese 
Earthquake and Fire 


BY 


H. M. HADLEY 


District Engineer in Charge of Seattle Office, Portland Cement Association 
One of the papers presented at the Twentieth 


Annual Convention of the American Concrete 
Institute held in Chicago, February 25-28, 1924 


FOREWORD 


Soon after the great earthquake that occurred in Japan on September I, 1923, 
reports of its effect on structures appeared in the Semi-Technical Press. These early 
accounts, however, fell short of presenting actual facts about what really happened. 


In order to obtain reliable inrormation about the effect of this great catastrophe 
on buildings, the Portland Cement Association sent H. M. Hadley, a Structural 
Engineer of wide experience, to Japan for a two month’s study of the situation. . 


The paper reprinted in this booklet constitutes Mr. Hadley’s complete report. It is 
hoped that this report may be of value to designers in making buildings safe against 
the effects of natural forces of unusual violence. 


It is well known that destructive earthquake shocks may be expected only in 
certain localities. However, a study of the effects of the Japanese earthquakes 
reveals much of interest and value regarding how to design buildings to withstand 
such agencies as tornadoes, hurricanes, yielding of foundations or other causes pro- 
ducing horizontal or vertical motions of the whole or a part of a building. 





Authorized reprint from the copyrighted Proceedings of 
AMERICAN CONCRETE INSTITUTE 
Vol. 20, 1924 


REPRINTED FOR 


PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION 


) 
5) 


> 
2 
DG o 
09% e Fo 
2 9? 9 


5, oe ) 

2 v 
s © 7 oi. 8 OG) Boot ser. 6 
» ) ) ‘ >} 4 





HOW STRUCTURES WITHSTOOD 
THE JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE 


By H. M. HApLrey* 


At noon on Saturday, Sept. 1, 1923, there occurred a great earthquake 
in the east central portion of the main island of Japan, which earthquake 
in its destructive consequences, is one of the worst recorded in human 
history. The earthquake itself wrought tremendous instant damage. 
Structures of all kinds that were deficient in foundations or rigidity broke 
and fell, bridge piers were overturned, tunnels were blocked, landslides 
swept down mountains, many thousands of people were killed, and vast 
havoc was caused. This was but the beginning, however. Occurring at 
the hour of noon when dinner was being prepared in many houses in 
Yokohama and Tokio, the collapse of weak structures, particularly the 
collapse of light-framed wooden Japanese houses, started simultaneous 
fires in many places, the building department of Tokio reporting that 
74 separate and distinct fires started a few minutes after the first de- 
structive shock with a total of 140 original fires, of which 15 were ex- 
plosive, 85 from stoves (hibachis) and 40 from sparks. Water mains and 
supply lines had been broken, many streets were choked with debris, fallen 
wires, abandoned vehicles, etc., and the densely built up cities consisting 
principally of wooden construction interspersed with brick buildings, and 
less frequently with buildings of reinforced concrete or structural steel 
frames, practically all without fireproof openings or details, stood as so 
much fuel for fire. Fire came. Conflagrations swept the cities, prac- 
tically wiping out Yokohama, destroying about 50 per cent. of Tokio, in- 
cluding the major part of the business district, and consummating the 
great disaster. 

No exact estimate of the damage is possible. One estimate gives 
80,000 human beings killed and 140,000 missing. Of the missing undoubt- 
edly many thousands were killed. Property of vast value was destroyed, 
probably four to five billion dollars worth. There is the further loss that 
cannot be evaluated of demoralization of business and loss of records, 
etc., etc. The Japanese Empire was dealt a very heavy blow. 

The Japanese islands constitute a region in which earthquake activity 
is more frequent and pronounced than anywhere else in the world. Hun- 
dreds of quakes occur annually, although the great majority are so slight 
as to be almost imperceptible. At varying intervals in past history, have 
occurred earthquakes of magnitude equal to or greater than this one, but 
this earthquake is the first in Japan to severely test modern building con- 
struction. 

*District ‘Tagineor Portiang Cement, ~Asseciation; Séattie, Wash. 


€ € ‘ 
© © ce €e eo “eve cee (Ql°x* ae e %,* € 
e 


THE GETTY RESEARGH 
INSTITUTE LIBRARY, 


JUL 17 1925 431 


THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 3 


Various observations at different stations agree in locating the origin 
of this present earthquake in Sagami Bay. Whether the cause be volcanic 
or tectonic, a great buckling of the earth’s crust occurred at this point. 
Preliminary soundings taken between Oshima Island and the southwest 
shore of Sagami Bay, reveal a 300 ft. uplift in the bottom of the bay at 
what had formerly been the point of maximum depth, accompanied by a 
600 ft. settlement, below its former depth, of the bottom on both sides of 
this newly uplifted portion. 

Incompleted surveys show marked changes in the elevation of the 
shores surrounding Sagami and Tokio Bays. Extensive uplifting of 
12 to 15 ft. has occurred in places with less uplift or sometimes settlement 
elsewhere. The tremors and vibrations set in motion by these great crustal 
changes are what constitute the disastrous earthquake of Sept. 1, 1923. 

Regarding the character of destructive earthquake vibrations, the fol- 
lowing is condensed from a paper written by the late Dr. F. Omori. The 
complete earthquake motion is composed of several sets of waves of dif- 
ferent transit velocities and different lengths of vibrational period. Due 
to the more rapid dissipation of energy in the waves of shorter period, it 
depends on the distance of the observing point from the origin of the 
quake, which of the several sets of waves is the most pronounced and pro- 
duces the maximum vibration. Maximum waves from a distant origin 
have an average period of 20 seconds; from a comparatively near origin 
(the example given has a distance of 2070 km. = 1286 miles), a period of 
8 seconds; and from a near origin, a period of from 1 to 2 seconds; gen- 
erally being 1.5 seconds. Waves of the first two classes are imperceptible 
without instrumental aid. Waves from a near origin and of short period’ 
are classified as longitudinal and transverse, the former and more rapid 
moving directly in the line from the subterranean origin to the point of 
observation; the latter and slower moving normal to the plane determined 
by the point of observation, the origin, and the epicenter, i. e., the point 
on the earth’s surface vertically above the origin. 

It is the period between the arrival of the longitudinal and transverse 
waves—that is, when only the longitudinal waves are felt—that consti- 
tutes the preliminary and minor phase of an earthquake. It is the trans- 
verse waves, which have in general, only a small vertical component, that 
produce the shocks of maximum intensity. Even in districts that have 
been situated directly above the origin of severe earthquakes, the evidence 
shows much greater damage from the transverse or horizontal vibrations 
than from the longitudinal, which in any epicentral zone are vertical. 
Observation shows that for a given period, the amplitude of vibration of 
the maximum transverse wave reduces inversely as the square of the dis- 
tance from the origin, or even more quickly, depending upon the character 
of the intervening material. 

From another of Dr. Omori’s papers, published in 1900, the following 
is quoted: “In ordinary cases the vertical component of earthquake 
motion is much smaller than the horizontal. Thus in the severe Tokio 
earthquake of June 20, 1894, the strong motion seismograph in the 


4 THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


Seismological Institute, recorded a maximum horizontal motion of 73 mm. 
(period 1.8 seconds) while the maximum vertical motion was only 11 
mm.” * * * * “JT may here note that earthquake motion, though 
sometimes very violent, is continuous and does not consist of isolated jerks 
or shocks. The idea prevalent among certain engineers that in destructive 
earthquakes, buildings are first uplifted by the vertical motion and are 
then destroyed by being suddenly thrown downward, is quite erroneous.” 

For the determination of the dynamic effect of earthquakes upon 
structures, the customary seismological measurements of time and 3- 
dimentional movement forms the basis. The unknown, unmeasured quan- 
tity is the velocity of motion at different points in the path of the earth- 
quake wave. 

The diagram herewith shows a graphical representation of one com- 
plete earthquake wave. Actually the points 0 coincide, but they are shown 
separated to illustrate the assumption which is made: namely, that in 





FIG. 1.—THEORETICAL EARTHQUAKE OSCILLATION, 


going from 0 to 0 the motion is harmonic; that the velocities along the 
path vary as the sines of the angles formed by a point moving at uniform 
velocity around a circular path in the period T. Under this assumption 
the maximum velocity of the earthquake wave occurs at the points 0, while 
the maximum acceleration occurs at the extremities of the path. Whence, 
mathematically, 


4a 7 
Te 
and I’, the dynamic earthquake effect, the earthquake force on structures = 


(+ =) G3) ( W = weight of structures.) 
g 1 

On September 1 at the Seismological Institute at the Imperial University, 
Tokio, the most severe shock had an amplitude of 10.3 cm. (4m) in a 
period of 144 seconds, of which the dynamic effect was, according to the 
above formula almost exactly 1/11 W. Greater motion occurred in later 
shocks, approximately 6 inches, but the time interval was greater and the 
first named shock was the maximum in so far as its effect on buildings and 





Max. Acceleration = 





THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 5 


structures is concerned. This observatory is situated on the high firm 
ground of the city where the motion was not so great as in the low lying 
business area. The observatory’s estimate of the motion in the low lying 
ground is from two to three times that at the observatory, and they esti- 
mate that the severity of the shock at Yokohama was three to three and 
a half times that at the University. 

If a glass of jelly be turned into a dish and the dish be shaken gently, 
relatively great motion of the jelly will ensue. This behavior is illustra- 
tive of the effect of earthquake vibrations in firm and soft ground. The 





FIG. 2.— SUMITOME WAREHOUSE—TOKIO. 


West and South elevations. 180 x 200 ft. high. Filled with heavy storage 
valued at $4,000,000 at time of earthquake. 


wave amplitude in firm material may be increased several-fold if the over- 
lying ground be soft, spongy or marshy. This fact has an important bear- 
ing on the Yokohama-Tokio disaster. 

These cities are both situated on the west shore of Tokio Bay; Tokio 
at the head of the bay and Yokohama, 18 miles distant, at the head of 
deep water navigation. From Yokohama southward the low irregular hills 
rise steeply from the water’s edge, in some cases cut by waves into bare 
abrupt bluffs, one hundred or more feet high. These hills are of recent 
geologic origin consisting of horizontally stratified beds of clays, sands, and 
gravels, and combinations of these materials, not yet solidified into rock, 
and topped by a loosely compacted reddish-yellow earth of probably vol- 
canic origin. From Yokohama northward to Tokio, the hills rise less 


6 THE JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND Fike. 





FIG. 3.—REINFORCED-CONCRETE WAREHOUSE AT HIGASHIKANAGAWA. 


Wreck due to foundation settlement. 





FIG. 4.—CASCADE BREWING CO.—TSURUMI. 


Reinforced Concrete. Only minor damage done to main building shown in 
photograph. 


THE JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 7 


abruptly and more gradually to the higher levels behind and except at a 
few points do not lie close to the shore, since the silting up of the upper 
bay by the discharge of several rivers and other geologic processes have 
built up a low flat marginal plain of varying width between the hills and 
the present water’s edge. Extensive areas have been filled and reclaimed 
at various times at Tokio, Yokohama and intermediate points, and most 
of the destroyed areas in both Tokio and Yokohama were situated on this 
low-lying ground. Particularly in Tokio, the boundaries of the fire-swept 
districts closely coincided with those of the low-lying ground on which the 
great majority of modern buildings were located. 





FIG. 5.—REINFORCED-CONCRETE GRAIN ELEVATOR AT HIGASHIKANAGAWA. 


In this stage of construction when earthquake occurred. One of the largest 
reinforced concrete structures in earthquake zone. Practically 
undamaged. Good pile foundations. 


While the earthquake in some instances damaged certain buildings and 
left other nearby ones untouched, this is not, as is sometimes suggested, 
to be regarded as a vagary in the occurrence of the shock. In any given 
district where soil conditions were identical throughout, it is practically 
certain that the shock was everywhere of consistent performance, and dif- 
ferences in damage are to be attributed to differences in the structures 
themselves. Also the speed of propagation of the earthquake motion is so 
great that except as results of local fissuring and cracking of the ground, 
no differential shaking of buildings can be supposed, i.e., any structure 
would be affected equally and simultaneously in all its parts. 


8 THE JAPANESE HKARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


Building construction in Japan is represented by structures of all 
characters, those of the type of the ancient empire, shut off from inter- 
course with the outer world, of course, predominating, but modern struc- 
tures of steel and reinforced concrete are numerous and are being built in 
ever increasing numbers. Reinforced concrete had been used in Tokio for 
some fifteen years; structural steel about five. Brick had been used ex- 
tensively for many years in the construction of stores, dwellings, factory 
buildings, etc., while wood and stone masonry had been used for centuries 
and it was in these last named materials that Japanese architecture had 
found its own characteristic and individual expression. 





FIG. 6.—PHOTO SHOWING GENERAL DESOLATION AT YOKOHAMA, 


Russo-Asiatiec Bank Building. 


Common to all types of buildings is the necessity for good founda- 
tions. Without full and adequate support no structure could be expected 
to stand and no structure did. There has been considerable discussion 
regarding the merits of mat and pile foundations. Hither is satisfactory 
so long as unyielding support is obtained. Inasmuch as the severe earth- 
quake motion is predominantly horizontal, the cushioning effect which it 
is claimed can be obtained with mat foundations is a cushioning not in 
the direction of the severe forces. On the other hand, where mat founda- 
tions do not have piles beneath them carried to a depth sufficient to fur- 
nish full and unyielding support, very expensive damages may result from 
the bodily settlement of these mat foundations with their superimposed 


THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 9 


building into the soft ground under the shaking effect of the earthquake. 
Where individual footings are used they should be connected with beams 
of sufficient strength to maintain them at all times in their normal rela- 
tive positions. i 

Reviewing the behavior of structures of the several building materials 
under the test of earthquake and fire, the following summary can be made: 


1. Wood.—In the fire-swept areas all evidence was destroyed. Else- 
where the performance was generally good. In Japanese houses where 
heavy tile roofs were carried by light wall posts with little bracing, more 





FIG. 7.—KIRIN BREWERY—YOKOHAMA. 


Photo shows undamaged reinforced concrete tower used for malt and 
hops storage. 


or less racking with consequent cracking of plaster ensued and, of course, 
there were numerous collapses of buildings inadequately braced and stif- 
fened. The Japanese are skillful carpenters and their houses are framed 
with mortise and tenon joints and wooden pins, etc. The combination of 
great strength with light weight that is the inherent character of wood, is 
most advantageous in structures subjected to earthquake shocks. At the 
same time the problem of efficient joints and connections becomes increas- 
ingly important. Two of the finest examples of wood construction are to 
be seen at an industrial plant at Kawasaki, where two buildings of rein- 
forced concrete collapsed and a third was badly damaged. These buildings 
had been designed by an American architect who had an adequate concep- 


339.5 
_ 2 ) p44 ) 3-9 
) 5) *] ) 
) I 50 yee) ) ) > 
) ) 


10 THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


tion of the forces to which these buildings might be subjected. Conse- 
quently all connections between beams and the columns which were closely 
spaced in one direction, had been knee-braced and well bolted and washers 
of generous size were used. At each of the three floors the buildings were 
trussed horizontally at all four walls and at all four corners vertical 
trusses in the plane of the side walls extended from the foundations to the 
roof. These buildings, full of valuable machinery, escaped without the 
slightest damage. 





FIG. 8.—ABSOLUTELY UNDAMAGED REINFORCED-CONCRETE BUILDING ON BLOCK 
ei IS MARUNOUCHI CENTRAL, TOKIO. 


2. Brick.—Regarding brickwork, it should be stated at the outset that 
practically all construction is with Japanese brick, of a strength no greater 
and probably weaker than American common brick. Mortar undoubtedly 
varied greatly in quality but the execution and workmanship of laying up 
brickwork is probably superior to American. In the vast amount of shat- 
tered brickwork fractures in general occurred through the brick itself and 
not along the mortar joints and also revealed the inner mortar joints well 
filled and without voids or holes. Construction of buildings generally in 
Japan is a more slow and deliberate process than in America, and work- 
manship can be correspondingly more thorough and careful. 

With certain splendid exceptions, brick failed badly and was respon- 
sible for great loss of life. The following is from the report of K. Satch, 
Structural Engineer of the Tokio Building Department, who was in charge 


, « ec Ge « 
« 

« Qe 

€ 


€ 
c 
€ 

€ 
€ 


€ 
c 
€ « 


Gg 6He CES HES of 
€ 

c c ae ef 

€ St) ot eoaie 


« 
c € 


of 


THE JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 11 


of the investigation of 485 brick structures in Tokio, 49 of which were 
situated on the relatively firm higher ground, and 436 on the low lying 
ground. Needless to observe, the percentages based on the low ground 
buildings are more representative than the high ground, since nine times 
as many buildings are under consideration. 








Districts. Entirely | Partially | Heavily | Slightly 
edee Collapsed. | Collapsed. | Damaged. | Damaged. E Sestiea os Or, 
Yamanote MUARUBON)  Feoe sco + 3 9 15 16 6 49 
Shitamachi (soft soil)............. 44 104 87 120 81 436 





Showing the above figures by percentages: 








SUE UTR ak aaa a er a 1 








ian SNOLeaee gee em onan. 6.0 18.4 
0.0 








FIG. 9.—TEMPORARY QUARTERS OF YOKOHAMA SPECIE BANK. 


Reinforced concrete and brick filler walls. Damage due to brick filler walls. 


Fundamentally the weakness of brick masonry is its low tensile 
strength which is insufficient to withstand the bending and swaying that 
an earthquake causes unless the walls be of considerable thickness and be 
well stiffened by the floor systems or heavy division walls. 


3. Structural Steel.—As stated, the use of structural steel for build- 
ing purposes is very recent in Japan. Nevertheless numerous large struc- 
tures had been completed and others were in the course of erection, when 


Le, THE JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


the earthquake occurred, and these buildings were sufficiently numerous 
and varied in character to permit conclusions to be drawn regarding their 
behavior. It is unnecessary to enumerate the known excellences of struc- 
tural steel, although the severe property losses that occurred in the burned 
areas from its use without any fire protection emphasizes the necessity for 
properly safeguarding it. What is the outstanding and unusual feature of 
skeleton steel framed buildings under earthquake conditions is their ten- 
dency to rock and sway. The sudden quick motion of the ground produces 
a correspondingly sudden bending and deformation of the steel columns 





FIG. 10.—PATENT OFFICE EXHIBITION BUILDING—TOKIO. 


- Rear North Elevation. Reinforced concrete. Failure due to inadequate 
foundations causing a 2-ft. settlement. 


and the horizontal load is thrown upon the stiffer vertical members of the 
structure: the exterior walls, interior partitions, stair and elevator en- 
closures, etc. Whereupon these secondary vertical members, unless they 
possess adequate power of resistance, are broken and shattered, and there- 
after the resistance is furnished by the structural steel alone, when on the 
other hand the wall construction possessed the adequate power of resistance 
no damage was entailed, the buildings standing rigid and unyielding. Four 
large completed steel frame buildings in Tokio and two practically com- 
pleted escaped without damage from the earthquake. The common char- 
acteristic of all of these buildings was their complete or extensive use of 
reinforced concrete wall construction. These buildings are the Industrial 


THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 13 


bank of Japan, the First Mutual Building, No. 21 Mitsubishi, and the 
building of Katakura & Company. These were completed and occupied. 
The two under construction were the Marumouchi Hotel and the Kokko 
Life Insurance Co. Building. These buildings all escaped with absolutely 
no damage. They were the only large steel frame buildings in Tokio which 
did. On the other hand, the 11 other large steel frame buildings which 
employed brick for their wall construction all sustained more or less dam- 
age due to the shattering of their exterior walls, breaking of interior par- 





FIG. 11.—INTERIOR VIEW SHOWING BADLY DAMAGED FIRST STORY COLUMN IN 
BUILDING NO. 25 OF INDUSTRIAL PLANT AT KAWASAKL 


Shows absence of spiralling and very light binders. 


titions, destruction of marble trim and wainscoting, damage to elevators, 
ete. One other large building had its structural steel frame completed and 
concrete wall construction started in the lower stories, but this building 
was not sufficiently advanced in its wall work to serve as proof of the 
merits of concrete wall construction for resistance to earthquake. Three 
other buildings, the Sumitomo Bank, the Mitsubishi Bank, and the main 
Central Railway Station were of structural steel and heavy brick or stone 
masonry. These were all rather low structures, however, and are not to 
be classed with those previously mentioned. Outside of Tokio no large 
structural steel frame buildings of the above character existed in the earth- 
quake region. A number of industrial plants had mill and shop buildings 


14 THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


of structural steel which behaved in an entirely satisfactory manner when 
adequately braced and not exposed to fire. 

A general survey of the situation leads to but one conclusion: Prop- 
erly designed structural steel buildings, well braced and thoroughly fire- 
proofed can be made earthquake-proof; the simplest, cheapest and most 
efficacious bracing can be secured by making the wall construction of re- 
inforced concrete. 





FIG. 12,—BUILDING NO. 18, INDUSTRIAL PLANT AT KAWASAKI, BETWEEN 
TOKIO AND YOKOHAMA. 


Reinforced concrete. Damage caused by poor foundations and lack of rigidity. 


4. Reinforced Concrete——tThe performance of reinforced concrete under 
the test of earthquake and fire can only be classed as highly satisfactory. 
A survey of reinforced concrete construction in Tokyo Prefecture conducted 
by the Tokyo Building Department under the direction of Mr. Y. Nagata, 
Chief Engineer, resulted in the following findings: 


Entirely | Partially | Greatly | Partially {rz damag 
Collapsed. | Collapsed. | Damaged. | Damaged. ee igh 


a | | | 


— | | — |_| | 


Percentage of total............... 1.3 1.9 Tal. ihe 78.0 100.0 


I questioned Mr. Nagata closely regarding the exact meaning of the 
terms of his classification, that are perhaps indefinite. Regarding “Entirely 


THE JAPANESE EHARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 15 


Collapsed” and “Partially Collapsed” there can be no uncertainty. “Greatly 
Damaged” he illustrated by two buildings: The Hoshi Drug Building and 
the Industrial Club of Japan. “Partially Damaged’ means without severe 
damage to structural frame, although the walls may be shattered. He 
gave me as examples of this classification the following structural steel 
framed buildings, Tokyo Kaijo, N. Y. K. Maranouchi, and Yuraku. “Un- 
damaged” includes cases of minor cracking of walls, but no damage to 
structural frame. The Sumitomo Warehouse illustrates this classification. 
As stated this survey includes damage by fire. Warehouses classed as par- 





FIG. 13.—POWER PLANT AT HIGASHIKANAGAWA, 


Reinforced concrete boiler house. Failure due to faulty engineering design. 
Heavy roof was not anchored, tore free from the columns and fell. 


tially collapsed would shift to the undamaged classification were the earth- 
quake alone considered and there are several other buildings which would 
be similarly changed. 

Elsewhere in Tokyo Prefecture the results obtained were as follows, 
this damage being solely by earthquake: 





Entirely | Partially | Greatly | Partially ‘ 
Collapsed. | Collapsed. | Damaged. | Damaged. Vndameged:| iT ote. 


— —____. | | | | 


Percentage of total............... 6.8 7.6 5.9 4.2 16.5 100.0 





16 THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


In giving me this information, Mr. Nagata told me it was preliminary, 
and subject to change and correction, but substantially was correct; 
changes to be minor only. 

Considering all things, this is a highly satisfactory performance. Par- 
ticularly is this true when the character of concrete in this district of 
Japan is known. No criticism can be made of the character of Japanese 
cement used in this district, but their aggregates as used would be sum- 
marily rejected in any construction work in this country. The sand itself 
is quite fine, of uniform size and of indifferent structural quality. The 





FIG. 14.—MITSUI NO. 3 BUILDING—TOKIO. 


North and West elevations. Reinforced-concrete—110 ft. high. Gutted by fire— 
uninjured by quake. Debris in foreground from adjoining brick 
structures. Concrete stack at left on Mitsui No. 4 Building. 


greatest trouble results from the coarse aggregate. This is river gravel 
of fair strength which is dug by hand from river bars. It is used in the 
condition in which it is dug, all particles being coated with silt, and with 
an admixture of about 25 per cent sand in the gravel. A composite sample 
taken from six different building jobs under construction in Tokyo showed 
the following results: Gravel contained 11/10 per cent silt in the coat- 
ings; sand contained 11%4 per cent silt; organic plate No. 2. Seven-day 
briquettes 85 per cent of Ottawa; 28-day briquettes 89 per cent of Ottawa. 
Average compressive strength of six 4x 8 cylinders stored 28 days in damp 
sand at 70 degrees F., 1103 pounds per square inch. With a division of 


THE JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. Ay 





FIG. 15.—POWER PLANT AT OIMACHI. 





FIG. 16.—NICHI NICHI BUILDING—TOKIO, 


Reinforced concrete. No damage. 


18 THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


material on the 144 inch screen the 1: 2: 4 mix which they so extensively 
employ would be actually a 1: 3: 3. With excess of water and poor cur- 
ing it is unlikely that their building concrete possesses a strength more 
than 800 or 900 pounds per square inch. Nevertheless, it is concrete of 
this character which performed as the above surveys show. It can only 
be expected that with really good concrete, a far better record would have 
been established. 





FIG. 17.—JUTSUGYO BUILDING. 


South and West elevations. Reinforced concrete, veneered with Japanese tile. 
Had recently been completed at time of earthquake. 


Causes of Failure.—The only good that can result from a disaster of 
this character is the lesson that is to be learned from it. In the field of 
concrete where failures occurred they were due to one or more of the 
following conditions: 


1. Inadequate foundations; 2. Violations of commonly accepted prin- 
ciples of engineering design; 3. Lack of rigidity in buildings. The third 
cause is the feature that is peculiar to earthquakes. The small one story 
market building at Yokohama shown in photograph No. 400 was 75 x 300 ft. 
in plan with 25 ft. square bays, was unusually well built, was thoroughly 
reinforced and the reinforcement was all fully anchored and hooked and 
no sign of foundation trouble was to be seen. Nevertheless, lacking 


THE JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 19 


rigidity, lacking resistance to the bending stresses developed by the sud- 
den horizontal motion of the ground on which the structure stood, it failed. 
How this stiffness is to be obtained is the problem of earthquake-proof con- 
struction. The solution is to make part or all of the wall construction of 





FIG. 18.—OKURA & CO., LTD., BUILDING, TOKIO. 


Reinforced concrete-—veneered with Japanese tile and stone. 


reinforced-concrete integral with the columns. This is but another way of 
saying to increase the dimensions of certain columns, since the introduction 
of a duly designed reinforced-concrete wall between and integral with two 
columns makes them act as one column, with a resistance to bending many 
times greater than that which the two separate columns formerly possessed. 
For example, a row of ten 1-ft. square columns 10 ft. on centers would 





20 THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


have a resistance to bending in the direction of the row which is a function 
of the square of the depth of the columns and may be represented by 10. 
The introduction of a reinforced-concrete wall between two of these columns 
would make a single column of the two, which single column would have 








FIG. 19.—KASHIMA BANK BUILDING—TOKIO. 


Reinforced concrete. Burned by fire. Undamaged by quake. 


a resistance to bending equal to 11? or 121. To secure equal resistance by 
increasing the size of each individual column would require that they be 
inade 3 ft. 6 in. each. 

The one story market building of photograph No. 400 had open walls 
between the wall columns. The introduction of 10 ft. wall sections at all 
four corners—points where the sacrifice of light is a minimum—and of 


THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 21 


~ 


small sections of wall perpendicular to the length at one or two points, 
would have unquestionably saved this building. How much wall is needed 
for any design is simply a question of the weight of the structure and the 
earthquake forces, which acting in any direction, must be designed for 





FIG. 20.—MITSUI NO. 4. BUILDING. 


Reinforced concrete. Gutted by fire. Undamaged by earthquake and does not 
have a crack in it. 


Where, as in certain buildings, it may be undesirable to use walls, then 
equivalent stiffness must be developed by trussing or by frame action. The 
use of relatively small diagonals for tension members in conjunction with 
the regular beams and columns of a building, would accomplish the desired 
result with a maximum of opening. 


22 THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 


Regarding the special features of Japanese reinforced-concrete design, 
the most noteworthy is the care given in their best practice to adequately 
anchor all reinforcement. Footing stubs and column verticals are hooked 
at the splices and all possible anchorage for all bars is secured. With the 
reversal of stress that accompanies earthquake motion the advisability of 
this practice is manifest. Laps of column verticals are based on tension, 
not compression. An attempt to vary and stagger the plane at which hori- 
zontal construction joints in columns are made so as not to have all 





FIG. 21.—MITSUBISHI HEAD OFFICE BUILDING—TOKIO. 


Reinforced conecrete—tile and stone veneer. Undamaged. 


joints in the same plane, was also observed. I question the necessity of 
this in a structure of good concrete with joints kept free from laitance, 
wood and general dirt. 

Wire mesh was used quite extensively for floor slab reinforcement. I 
noted that it was invariably in the bottom of the slab at supporting beams 
instead of at the top where it belonged. Whether this was intentionally 
or unintentionally misplaced, I do not know. 

The use of metal lath between beams for combined forms and slab 
reinforcement was observed in two failures. This construction provides no 
continuity of reinforcement in beams, and there is a lack of strength in 
consequence. 


THE JAPANESE HARTHQUAKE AND FIRE. 23 


The omission of slab reinforcement in a concrete joist job was likewise 
noted. This detail did not increase the strength of the structure. The 
omission of mesh reinforcement in fireproofing structural steel columns 
entailed disastrous consequences, in one or two instances, most strikingly 
in the case of the Mitsubishi warehouse at Tokyo. This was a large two- 
story warehouse of reinforced-concrete except for the interior columns 
which were angle latticed steel, fireproofed with two inches of concrete 
but without mesh. This building withstood the earthquake without any 
damage, but in the ensuing fire the concrete fireproofing spalled, the col- 
umns buckled, and the major portion of the building collapsed. 

Of all structures of reinforced-concrete, chimneys gave the most un- 
satisfactory performance. There were many that successfully withstood 
the earthquake, but there were likewise many which failed, and in several 
instances caused great damage to structures nearby. The poor quality of 
the concrete revealed itself most plainly in these structures, where con- 
crete of especially good quality is required. 

Bridges of structural steel and reinforced-concrete gave entirely satis- 
factory performance when they received the support they deserved from 
piers and abutments. The 125 ft. skew arch on the Tokyo elevated rail- 
way, a short distance north of the Central railroad station, was entirely 
undamaged. Several steel bridges in the fire zone suffered damage to their 
floor systems where wood decks were used and wooden trestles likewise 
suffered damage from fire. One of the most disastrous failures was on 
the main line railway at the crossing of the Baniu River where a long 
steel plate girder bridge went down due to the overturning of brick masonry 
piers. Mention should be made of the admirable performance of the ele- 
vated railway construction in Tokyo. South of the station for two or three 
miles the track is elevated and carried on a series of brick masonry arches 
of 40 to 50 ft. spans, terminating in heavy abutments at the street inter- 
sections. This work stood perfectly. So likewise did a mile of reinforced- 
concrete elevated construction, north of the Central station. 

Concrete retaining walls gave generally satisfactory performance. 
Foundation troubles were responsible for any damages which I observed. 

Regarding tunnels, the only lined tunnel which I saw was through 
the Bluff at Yokohama, about 14 mile long and was lined with brick. One 
portal was damaged by a landslide, but otherwise it escaped undamaged. 
On the main railroad lines through the mountains landslides blocked 
numerous tunnels. 

In conclusion I would state that in general satisfactory performance 
was obtained only with structural steel or reinforced-concrete; that the 
concrete was of uniformly inferior character; that despite this fact its 
behavior was admirable; that skeleton construction with either material 
without bracing is inadequate; that firm and unyielding foundations are 
essential; that in building construction the use of reinforced-concrete walls 
is the simplest, best and cheapest insurance against earthquake damage. 





HE American Concrete Institute is an or- 
ch: ganization of voluntary workers for the 

most intelligent and economical use of 
concrete in all its applications. Its membership 
includes architects, constructors, concrete prod- 
ucts manufacturers, engineers and others, reports 
of whose researches and practical experience, 
and whose adopted standards of design and 
practice have in twenty years of the organiza- 
tion’s work vastly influenced for good the whole 


broad use of concrete. 


The Institute thus provides a comradeship 
in determining the best ways to do concrete 
work of all kinds and in spreading knowledge 
of these methods —a comradeship which is 
enjoyed by more than 1300 practical-minded 
students of the material throughout the world. 


More detailed information regarding the or- 
ganizations present activities in more than 
thirty technical committees, each studying a 
particular phase of the Institute's special work, 
and as to the Society's accumulated literature 


on concrete may be had upon inquiry of 


THE SECRETARY, 


AMERICAN CONCRETE INSTITUTE 
1807 East Grand Boulevard, Detroit Michigan 








AS 











t 
i} 








lls 

















 } 


























ser 





Ny 








a 





























“aN 


apie 





Wa 
































AQ 








AY, 














ser te 
to I ee Boo 
Tues Bal 
ihe oo i. > 
s x ri 
a wv ~ . 























ARAL 
Wide 2 
sale We & 


BEC 17 1993 








GETTY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 


MINT 


5 01013 5016 





is 


7 


th at i De mh 


a vt 


eo +! tne 


oreeen 


Ba ta 


fis 
tte wih 


Phea’yt ay 


is oe 


pectic eee 
me: 


if his 
is at age has 


Ree 


‘ 


Bhxle 
a 
ee, pai, 
= A a ‘reel 
Sani 5 sta 
ual: 


Yj 
Wir i 


as Ant 
a, a 


Phy dode 14 ge 

ani line ‘ 
sane 
: eA ew 4 


shine 
patel y 


bias 

Se ff, : albu Nee np nde 
Cates cia ae 
ses wey ean oa i 


uf 
4 yah abit 


ihc cali nite, 
RT TVA Epa nee 
Haran 


RD} 


Heo é 
ey }; 
UES hat 


i} 


a uss 


4 i 
loin 
pints 
vat 


eM 


tpt 
iy 


Phi 


ete tee ca ‘ : nn f Ae 
ae i a = ee 


We) 
t dy 

bs 
bain NA 
pe ahead 


ft fi os pea ve 
RMS alec de ae *: 


Sate 
pms As 


eh Gee eit ba! 
pews FY Fey 
fy 


giana 


de 
‘indi tes ; 


Oey 


i) ie ra 


nat trey 


Je A vent 


ie ad 


sas ay 


Ws 


ae gidwis shy ited 


Ldw te dt rhe, 


hx, ia 
a 
{thay 


ae 


Ps 





